









# CRACKING THE COLOR LINE



*non-violent direct action methods of eliminating racial discrimination*




I like what CORE is doing. The techniques so graphically described in "Cracking The Color Line" should be widely studied by all who work to achieve a just and democratic America. You—the people who carry on CORE action—realize the difficulty of achieving full integration and use brains and imagination as well as good-will, self-discipline and persistence.

I especially like the non-violent CORE approach. I cannot see how means can be separated from ends, how the process can be judged in one light, and the goal in another.

We can and must win the mind of the prejudiced person. Force doesn't change minds. Anger reinforces fears. And that is why it is so terribly urgent to work out the techniques of changing people's minds, of allaying their fears about integration.

CORE puts before people's eyes a new way of acting. You say and you show that feelings about segregation are silly, that customs can change without disaster following, and that this is the time to change them. And you proceed to demonstrate. Here is a method of achieving social change which we all may use.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Martin L. King, Jr.", with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

—Martin Luther King, Jr.



DINNER AT STONER'S

DINNER AT STONER'S

DINNER AT STONER'S



**T**HREE CORE MEMBERS were refused lunch at Stoner's, a white-tablecloth restaurant in the heart of Chicago's Loop in October 1942. Mr. Stoner met the three as they came through the swinging doors and said he could not give them a seat—he did not serve colored. He seemed annoyed when the three asked him why he had this policy. When he stated that he could do as he liked in his own restaurant, they sat down on a sofa near the door to await service.

They waited for forty-five minutes in vain.



They asked for seats at tables on several occasions. Mr. Stoner refused to make an appointment to discuss the question with CORE committees. Attempts were made by letter and phone. Finally CORE decided to send committees to see him without appointment. Two white women ate lunch there one noon, and had a brief talk with Mr. Stoner. He claimed he would lose all his white trade if colored people came to his restaurant. He said that 90% of his trade came from women and they would not want to eat beside Negroes. He said that if members of the two races ate in the same restaurant, it would lead to interracial marriage and he was opposed to this.

Another interracial CORE committee visited Mr. Stoner in his office one morning before the restaurant opened for business. This committee talked with him for fully half an hour, but without satisfaction. He claimed that other restaurants of his class did not serve Negroes.

## PERSUASION

Following these attempts to negotiate, small interracial groups visited the restaurant on many occasions to try to get service. At first Mr. Stoner refused to allow the hostesses even to seat the groups at the tables.

*As time passed, some of the small test groups would be seated after a considerable wait, only to be served meat with egg shells scattered on it, or a plate of food salted so heavily that it could not be eaten, or a sandwich composed of tomato and lettuce cores picked out of the garbage in the kitchen (so the group was told by Negro bus girls who witnessed the making of the sandwiches).*

For one entire week in December 1942, CORE passed out leaflets to the patrons of Stoner's both at noon and in the evening, calling their attention to the policy of discrimination and asking them to protest as they paid their bills.

The facts of the case were publicized among many groups in Chicago and again and again the question was asked of CORE: "Why pick on Mr. Stoner? Don't other restaurants discriminate as well?" As a result of this prodding, CORE investigated the policies of all eating places within an area of sixteen square blocks of the Loop. In not a single case was outright discrimination practiced. A leaflet entitled "50 Loop Restaurants Which Do Not Discriminate" was published by CORE as a result of this investigation, and it received wide circulation among both Negro and white groups.

Following the survey, CORE felt entire-





ly justified in taking action against Stoner's, for no other place was known to be so flagrant in its violation of the civil rights law of Illinois. Mr. Stoner was informed of the results of the survey. When a few further attempts were made to receive service in Stoner's without success, it was decided that a sit-in should be tried. CORE realized that it would be difficult to stage a successful sit-in at Stoner's, for this restaurant could seat at least 200 persons. Nevertheless, the sit-in was planned and executed in June 1943.

## ACTION

Approximately sixty-five persons participated—sixteen of whom were Negroes. All participants were pledged to non-violence. The whites had agreed to remain in their seats (all night if necessary) until the Negroes were seated and given good service. The action took place in late afternoon and early evening of a Saturday. Between 4:30 and 5:10 most of the white participants went by twos, threes and fours into the restaurant. They were, of course, seated without difficulty by the hostesses. At 5:15 the first of two interracial groups consisting of six Negroes and two whites walked through the revolving doors of the restaurant. This group was ignored when the spokesman asked for seats. So the group stood quietly at the front of the restaurant, waiting to be seated and watching while others who had come in after them were seated by the hostesses. Finally, after a wait of only half an hour, one of the hostesses approached the group and asked them to follow her. A special table, large enough for all, had been set in a prominent place. Immediate service was given these persons. The only regrettable event marking the seating of this first interracial group was that Mr. Stoner without provocation kicked one of the white persons in the leg.

The seating of the first group was the signal for the second group to enter. Nine Negroes and one white made up this unit. They were not seated by the hostesses,



but rather were threatened by Mr. Stoner. For an hour and a half this group of ten persons stood at the front of the restaurant. During that time the police were called on three occasions. The police were, however, quite friendly to the CORE members. They wanted to know what was going on and were told—there was nothing they could do, for the interracial group was far from causing a disturbance. The third time the police were called, they told Mr. Stoner not to call them again or they would arrest him.

*The attention of everyone in the restaurant was, of course, attracted to the interracial group. CORE members who were seated explained the situation to other patrons. Much sympathy was aroused. Even some of the white employees expressed sympathy, including one of the hostesses who whispered into the ear of a sitdowner: "Keep it up—we're all with you." The Negro bus girls were excited about the non-violent action. They said to several CORE members that they planned to quit their jobs immediately if the interracial group were not served. Only two persons (a middle-aged couple) were observed walking out of the restaurant without eating. It was evident that most of the patrons supported the action.*

It began to look as though the second group might have to stand all night. But unexpectedly the deadlock was broken. An elderly woman, not connected with CORE, walked up to one of the Negro girls who was standing and asked if she would sit down at the table with her. Of course, the CORE member accepted. Then several of the seated white CORE members followed the lead of this woman. In a very few minutes only two of the ten persons in the second interracial group were still standing. One of the hostesses advanced toward them and asked them to follow her. She seated them at a table for two near the center of the restaurant. Then a very unexpected, spontaneous demonstration took place—a wild applause broke out. Practically everyone in the restaurant took part in this sustained acclamation. It was a fitting climax to a well-

executed non-violent demonstration for racial justice.

## **FOLLOW-THROUGH**


Although good food was served to all the persons who participated in this action, Stoner's was not yet entirely clear of discrimination. On two occasions, Negroes received service, but only after carrying on a conversation with Mr. Stoner, explaining why they wanted to eat there. On another occasion two girls, one white and one colored, were seated but were not served for the hour in which they remained in their seats. But finally the policy of the restaurant changed completely, according to all reports. Over three years after the sit-in, in the fall of 1946, interracial groups visiting the restaurant indicated that they had no trouble.



A TALE OF TWO CITIES

A TALE OF TWO CITIES

A TALE OF TWO CITIES



**T**HE TWO CITIES ARE ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI AND BALTIMORE, MARYLAND. The tale tells how CORE techniques changed city-wide patterns of restaurant discrimination.

When St. Louis CORE started its campaign in 1949, and Baltimore CORE in 1953, no eating place in the two cities with the exception of those in the railroad station and those in Negro ghetto areas, served Negroes. When St. Louis CORE concluded its campaign in 1953 and Baltimore CORE in 1954, all downtown dime stores in the two cities served everybody, regardless of color, at their lunch counters.

Once the dime stores' policy was changed, CORE found it less difficult to get drug stores, cafeterias and department store restaurants to end discrimination—the jimcrow pattern had been broken.



## ST. LOUIS


St. Louis CORE's dime store campaign ended in the spring of 1953 when McCrory's district manager ordered the local manager to serve Negroes. In appealing to McCrory's national office, Billie Ames of St. Louis CORE reviewed the campaign thus:

*"Three and a half years ago, CORE began talking with the managers of all four downtown dime stores. In some instances we felt our talks were unsuccessful and CORE resorted to peaceful direct action such as picket lines and sit-in demonstrations to bring the matter to the attention of the public.*

*"Shortly thereafter an agreement was made with Mr. Dwyer, who was then local manager of McCrory's, to allow one or two Negroes a week to be served at white counters to test customer reaction. Very*

*would start serving Negroes when the other dime stores did. We hoped this would be true even though your store now has a new manager."*

While it was not true when Billie Ames made this statement, it became true soon thereafter, bringing the dime store campaign to a successful conclusion.



*soon the other dime stores in the downtown area started similar experiments. The experiments continued for many months and showed that most white people are completely indifferent as to who is sitting at the counter.*

*"Since conducting the experiments, three dime stores—Kresge's, Neisner's and Woolworth's—have changed their policies and are now serving everybody. Before Mr. Dwyer left the employ of McCrory's, he stated several times that McCrory's*

## CAMPAIGN HIGHLIGHTS

CORE's plan of experiment testing, in which the dime stores started by "trying on" non-discrimination before "wearing" it, succeeded in proving the stereotyped fears of management to be unfounded—fears of business losses, riots, etc. In some instances management agreed for CORE to send only one group to their lunch counter a week; in other instances, as frequently as one group a day. The fact that there were no adverse reactions from other customers was real proof to the management.

At the halfway mark of the campaign, in the summer of 1951, CORE participants faced a number of violent assaults by members of Gerald L. K. Smith's Christian Nationalist Party. Members of this group sneered "Let's get the Kike," when they beat Marvin Rich (now Community Relations Director of CORE) over the head as he left a CORE project at the Forum Cafeteria. But the CORE members responded non-violently and by summer's end, the attacks ceased.



During a sit-in on August 11 at Kresge's, three Christian Nationalists were permitted to distribute racist leaflets inside the store. CORE got a snapshot of one of them in friendly conversation with the assistant manager.

On this occasion, Willie Mae Humphrey, Negro CORE member, sat at the counter with a sign on her back saying: "We have been waiting for service \_\_\_\_ hours and \_\_\_\_ minutes." Another group member changed the time on the sign as each quarter hour passed. In the next seat was Billie Ames with a little box of CORE leaflets on her back inscribed with the words: "Take one." Customers took 800 of them.

## DEPARTMENT STORES

About a year after the end of the dime store campaign, following 18 months of sit-ins and leaflet distributions by CORE, Stix, Baer & Fuller, a big department store, opened its downstairs lunch counter to everybody. The group had initiated its campaign there five years previous even before starting on the dime stores. Famous-Barr, another big department store where CORE had been using the same experiment testing plan as in the dime stores, soon followed suit and opened its lunch counter.

Extending the new pattern from downtown into the suburbs, by the fall of 1954, CORE succeeded in changing the lunch counter policies at all three dime stores in suburban Wellston.

By the fall of 1958, Famous-Barr extended its non-discriminatory lunch counter policy to the table restaurants—not only at the main store but at branches in outlying shopping centers.

Several months previous, in an attempt to persuade Stix, Baer & Fuller to extend its lunch counter non-discrimination, 10 CORE members stood in line for two hours seeking service at the tearoom—and it became a sort of alumni day.

Although several years had elapsed since the group's 18-month campaign to

open the lunch counter, several of the store personnel and particularly the detectives, recognized CORE members, greeted them, asked after their families, how many children they had, etc.

*The store personnel could not help but be impressed by CORE and its non-violence. They had not forgotten over the years. Their friendliness reflected the attitude of many in St. Louis toward CORE's campaign. The "show-me" state of Missouri had been shown.*

## BALTIMORE

In Baltimore in 1954 an award which carries considerable prestige, that of the Sidney Hollander Fund, was voted to CORE "for service rendered in helping to make the lunch counters in the five-and-dime stores available for use by Negroes as well as whites." The year-long campaign of Baltimore CORE was also hailed editorially by the Baltimore Afro-American and Pittsburgh Courier, two leading Negro papers. As in St. Louis, the Baltimore campaign ended the city-wide jimcrow eating pattern.





Early in 1953 shortly after its formation, Baltimore CORE launched its lunch counter campaign, which in addition to the downtown section included the vicinity of Morgan State College. After several leaflet distributions, Woolworth's and Kresge's changed their lunch counter policies. Then, came Shulte-United. McCrory's followed suit a few months after its policy change in St. Louis, having received orders from its main office in New York. The local manager, with whom Baltimore CORE had been in contact, called to inform them of the change.

*The lone holdout was Grant's—and this required a major campaign. In the late fall, Baltimore CORE initiated a program of weekly sit-ins. On December 12, 38 people took part. When the white members of the group were served, they passed their food to Negro members. The employes thereupon roughly yanked plates, cups and silver off the counter, but the group continued to sit there.*

In support of the Baltimore campaign, New York CORE started picketing and distributing leaflets in front of Grant's store located in the center of Harlem, the city's biggest Negro section.

## **FINAL ROUND**

On April 27 New York CORE picketed the annual stockholders meeting while the author of this book, representing a minority stockholder, raised the Baltimore discrimination issue on the floor. Until then the head office had maintained a

hands-off policy, contending that the question could be settled only locally in Baltimore. But at this meeting, the chairman, Lewis C. Lustenberger, first vice president of the company, promised that the head office would intercede. Nine days later the Baltimore group received a letter from Lustenberger announcing that thereafter eating facilities at Grant's Baltimore store would be open to all, regardless of color.

Thus the Baltimore CORE dime store campaign ended successfully. A favorable factor was that during the campaign, restaurant discrimination in nearby Washington, D. C. ended following the Supreme Court decision in the Thompson case (June 2, 1953). A large part of the action groundwork for that decision had been made by CORE during its annual summer workshops in Washington.


Immediately following the end of the dime store campaign, Baltimore CORE, working closely with other community groups, started negotiations with Read Drug & Chemical Co., operator of 37 local drug stores with lunch counters. After eight months of negotiation, Arthur Nattans, Sr., company president, announced that thereafter everybody would be served regardless of color at all 37 stores. In December 1956, the group started its first action campaign at a white tablecloth restaurant—Wilson's. While the campaign was not immediately successful, within two years the restaurant changed policy.



THE CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS WHITE

THE CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS WHITE

THE CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS WHITE



**T**HE CORE METHOD OF NON-VIOLENT ACTION has been proven successful in all types of public accommodations. It has been used by various groups to end discrimination in theaters, amusement parks, swimming pools, barber shops, hotels, motels, drive-ins, bowling alleys, skating rinks, playgrounds and YMCAs.



The technique of peacefully waiting in line, insisting on the right to buy a ticket, was first used by CORE in a theater situation in the fall of 1949. The theater was the Trans-Lux in Washington and the film showing was "*Home of the Brave*," first Hollywood production to deal forthrightly with the issue of racial discrimination. Leaflets explaining the waiting line to the theater's patrons, pointed out that "*Home of the Brave*" shows "colored and white fighting together to protect those rights and ideals which are denied them in this theater."

While this action was effective, the Trans-Lux did not become the first Washington theater at which CORE was successful. The first was the Playhouse, the city's leading art theater. An 8-month campaign by CORE's Washington group ended on April 18, 1951 in a striking movie-climax manner.

The occasion was the grand opening of "*Tales of Hoffman*," produced by Lopert Films, which also operated the Playhouse. It was a benefit performance for the National Symphony Association, with seats at \$10.

Two weeks before the opening, CORE picketed the theater. A week later Victor Orsinger, local representative of Lopert Films, asked for a conference. Between then and the opening CORE held long conferences with Orsinger and with Jerry Wagner, the manager. A second picket line marched on April 14. Within the next two days, CORE contacted every city editor and drama critic telling them about the 8-month campaign.

*"The climax came at 7:45 p.m., opening night,"* relates Albert Mindlin of CORE. *"A brass band was on hand. Klieg lights flooded the street. A crowd of spectators gathered. Police were on hand in large numbers. About 25 of us were assembled ready to start picketing. Suddenly Orsinger appeared, appealed to us to call off the picket line and made a very strong moral commitment, which he subsequently kept. The picketing was called*



off. *The Playhouse was opened to all, regardless of color.*"

A slightly different technique was used by the Denver group, in CORE's first campaign involving theaters. In that city in 1943, Negroes could buy tickets and enter, but could not sit in the orchestra.

So, Negro members of the group simply took seats in the orchestra, ignoring attempts by the ushers to steer them up to the balcony. The campaign wound up following the arrest of seven pickets who raised their placards in front of the Broadway Theater after a group had been refused orchestra seats inside. Their attorney wrote the Denver commissioner pointing out that the theater's discriminatory policy violated the state's civil rights law. There ensued a conference between the commissioner and the theater managers which resulted in ending discrimination in all Denver theaters.

## PARKS AND POOLS

*On "All Nations Day," 1958, an annual event at Baltimore's Gwynn Oak Amusement Park where only white nationals are admitted, the local CORE group added the waiting-line technique to its habitual picketing. For three years previous, Baltimore CORE in conjunction with other community groups had picketed the event to spotlight the inconsistency of an "All Nations Day" which bars Negroes. In 1959, three CORE members were beaten. Resulting publicity strengthened the drive to include all races as well as all nations.*

In two CORE campaigns—at Palisades Park swimming pool, opposite the Hudson from New York and at Bimini Baths in Los Angeles—waiting lines were met with violence on the part of management. But in both cases, CORE participants remained non-violent and stood their ground. Both campaigns were eventually successful.



The provocation in the Palisades campaign was extreme. Melba Vallé, young Negro model, was carried bodily from the Pool ticket office to the Park entrance and ejected. The author of this book on one occasion suffered a broken rib and on another was knocked out by Park guards. James Robinson was alternately kned from behind and elbowed in the stomach from in front—until non-CORE bystanders interceded. This brutality took place in full view of local police, some of whom worked as Park guards on their days off. But despite the violence, interracial CORE groups returned to the Park each weekend throughout the summers of 1947 and 1948 until the pool finally admitted Negroes. Ironically, management's brutality speeded the



campaign. Newspaper stories about how CORE members were manhandled, and critical editorials, helped toward enactment of the 1949 Freeman Civil Rights Act, which names swimming pools as one of the types of public accommodation where discrimination is prohibited in the state of New Jersey.

Following passage of the law Palisades reached a verbal agreement with New Jersey's newly-established Division Against Discrimination. This agreement was observed fairly well throughout the summers of 1949 and 1950, CORE tests showed. But by the summer of 1951 management began to backslide.

So, early in the summer of 1952, four Negro CORE members who had not been recognized as such and had been refused admission filed complaints under the Freeman act. Faced with an impending public hearing, Palisades put into writing the verbal agreement made with the Division Against Discrimination three years earlier and since then a policy of non-discrimination has been observed.

*Regarding the new policy, Irving Rosenthal, the Park's owner, who had said as late as the summer of 1948: "You'll all be dead before I change," told Harold Lett of the Division Against Discrimination that he had been a fool not to change long ago. Rosenthal had discovered, first hand, that his fears of loss of business—fears expressed by so many business men faced with the prospect of integration—had not materialized.*

## **STORY OF A BARBER SHOP**

A novel method of ending barbershop discrimination was evolved by CORE in

1949 at State College, Pa., a college town of 20,000. The usual CORE method—which has proved successful in many localities—of simply having a group, with Negroes first-in-turn, sit down in the shop awaiting service, did not work in State College. The town's barbers had formed a united front against any policy change, despite a CORE-initiated petition bearing 2,000 signatures.

So, CORE embarked on a plan of selling haircut tickets which would be presented at any barbershop that would adopt a policy of non-discrimination. This produced over \$1,800, which CORE offered as cash in advance to any shop that would change. None accepted the offer.

CORE then placed ads in nearby metropolitan papers: "Students and citizens of State College offer location and \$1,800 cash advance toward patronage to barber without racial prejudice." Over 60 inquiries were answered in detail. More than 20 barbers came for interviews.

*The man who finally set up the shop was Mark Butler of Philadelphia. After his equipment had been installed, CORE paid him the \$1,800 cash in advance and he agreed to service holders of the non-discriminatory haircut tickets. The shop opened without fanfare. Negroes patronized it freely and none of the white customers showed any surprise. Butler and his assistant barbers were overworked. The shop soon had to expand.*

One man whom CORE members had come to consider perhaps the most extreme racist in town had his hair cut twice at Butler's shop during the first months. His only explanation was: "I like Butler: he's a good guy."



## THE BLACKBOARD AND THE BALLOT

## THE BLACKBOARD AND THE BALLOT

## THE BLACKBOARD AND THE BALLOT



Associated Press

**F**OLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 1954, school integration became a national aim. The right of all citizens to vote was emphasized by Congress when it enacted the 1957 Civil Rights Law. Thus, schooling and voting became the chief focus of the equal rights struggle in the South. In both of these areas, CORE has done significant work.



Associated Press

## THE NASHVILLE STORY

In Nashville, CORE together with the Negro PTA helped to make school integration work despite mob violence which marked the change-over from segregation in the fall of 1957. In so doing, CORE evolved a workable, community program which might well be applied in any southern community where court-ordered school integration is being thwarted.

*"If Little Rock had had a similar interracial group, Governor Faubus might have been checked without the use of federal troops,"* wrote Martin Luther King, Negro leader of non-violence. Specifically, he pointed out: *"The key to success in Nashville was CORE's policy of backing up the parents—by visiting them and by escorting their children to integrated schools."*

King wrote this in a preface to the pamphlet, *"A First Step Toward School Integration,"* in which Anna Holden, a leader of Nashville CORE, gives a vivid account of the group's campaign.

For example, the day the Hattie Cotton school was bombed, the pamphlet relates: *"Mrs. Watson telephoned Dr. Miller (a member of the CORE group).*

*"If I ever needed anybody, I needed somebody that morning," she recalled. 'I had gotten a phone call threatening to set the house on fire if Barbara Jean went to school. I couldn't go off and leave the rest of the children alone. And I knew she had to go to school.'*

*"Barbara Jean was dressed and ready. Dr. Miller came promptly. He drove the child five blocks to her school. Then he took her by the hand and they walked through a crowd of jeering whites."*

*"The same morning Mrs. Charles Martin, another CORE member, walked to the Jones School with her neighbor, Mrs. Myrtle Battle and another first grader, Charles Edward Battle. In the Glenn School area of East Nashville the Rev. R. W. Kelley of Clark Memorial Church accompanied several children to school. Teen-age boys in the booing crowd got themselves photographed for newspapers by standing behind Rev. Kelley, pretending to measure him for a coffin."*

The pamphlet goes on to relate how "the crisis was soon reduced to manageable size" and how Kasper (John Frederick Kasper, professional segregationist who had come to Nashville for the occasion) and his mobs were suppressed. As Anna Holden explains it:



*"The tide was turned because the police finally enforced the law and because a handful of Negro parents, staunchly backed by the Negro PTA, CORE, ministers and other forces of decency, persisted in sending their children to formerly white schools."*

The following year, 1958, Nashville took the second step of its grade-a-year plan, extending integration from first to second grade. Though Anna Holden feels that the grade-a-year plan is too slow (total number of Negro children enrolled for the 1958-59 school year was 34), she concluded: *"Considering the general pattern in the south and last year's mob violence, CORE and other interested organizations feel gratified by the outcome of Nashville's 'second step.'"* By September 1959, 41 Negro students were attending integrated schools.

## **PILGRIMAGE TO RICHMOND**

Another outstanding CORE achievement on the school issue was mobilization of the Pilgrimage of Prayer for Public Schools, which brought 2,000 persons to Richmond on New Year's Day, 1959, to protest Virginia's "massive resistance" program.

*"Passive Resistance Opposes Virginia's Massive Resistance,"* was the apt headline of one southern newspaper. The demonstration was precedent-setting in that it took place—not in New York, Washington, Chicago, etc., where the big civil rights rallies had been held in the past, but in a southern city. This Pilgrimage played a significant role in the subsequent collapse of Virginia's "massive resistance" program which had deprived 13,000 children of education for the first half of the 1958-59 school year.


Major credit for mobilizing the Pilgrimage goes to a young Petersburg minister, Wyatt Tee Walker, and Gordon R. Carey, a CORE field secretary.

## **VOTING IN SOUTH CAROLINA**

On the voting issue, early in 1958, James T. McCain, a CORE field secretary, started organizing a registration campaign in an area of South Carolina where he has lived and worked for the major part of his life. Aim of the campaign was to translate the newly-enacted federal civil rights law into reality by getting Negroes to exercise their right to vote.

McCain's procedure was to establish in each county a committee which instructs persons on how to fill out application blanks, accompanies them to registration offices and remains with them until they receive their certificates for voting. Applicants who fail to receive certificates because of any error on the blank are given further instruction by the committee and are taken back to the registration office to re-apply.

Within the first two months, four such committees were established—in Charleston County; Sumter County, where McCain's home is located; Richland County, which includes the city of Columbia, and Clarendon County, where the first school desegregation suit originated. Other committees have been established since.



Commenting on the South Carolina registration campaign a year after it started, McCain said: *"In counties where we have CORE affiliates, the percentage of Negroes registered is higher than in counties where no such group has been organized. For the first time, during the year's primary runoffs, candidates have invited Negroes to meet with them and discuss community problems. In a number of communities candidates who stressed segregation were defeated. Negroes ran for public office in larger numbers this year than in any year since Negroes won the right to vote in the South Carolina state primaries."*

For example, in 1958 Negroes for the first time took over all Democratic Party offices in Sumter's Precinct 3-B and elected 16 of the 17 delegates to the Dem-

ocratic County Convention. Rev. Fred C. James, a Negro and a leader of Sumter CORE, set a precedent by running for city council. In Columbia, according to *The State*, local newspaper, "the predominantly Negro ward 9—was more than enough to make the difference" of 14 votes by which Lester Bates nosed out his strongly segregationist opponent in the 1958 mayoralty election.

In the South Carolina campaign there has been excellent cooperation between CORE and Martin Luther King's Crusade for Citizenship, the NAACP and various local groups such as the Palmetto Voters Association.

It is the policy of CORE to work to increase the number of Negro voters. However, CORE does not endorse candidates or engage in partisan politics.





**A**S THE JIMCROW LINE RECEDES  
SOUTHWARD, so does the focus  
of CORE activity.

In Marion, South Carolina, in the spring of 1959 the operator of Hewitt Esso Service Station ran a drive-in ice cream stand next door where he required Negroes to go to a side window for service. In his service station, he had a water fountain with paper cups and a sign "For Whites Only."

"As chairman of CORE, I had a talk with him," relates George Kelly. "Then I called a meeting and we went into action. Several CORE members who had large monthly accounts at the station went to the stand and tried to get ice cream at the front window. They were told to go to the side window."

*"They then stated that if they couldn't be served at the front window, they didn't want the ice cream. Next they went over and paid up their accounts at the gas station, announcing to the operator that they would not trade with him any more.*

*"Other Negroes did likewise, until finally he had to close the service station. But rather than close the ice cream stand, he shut the side window and started serving everyone from the front window.*

*"Word of this spread and Negroes began getting better service from other businesses in town."*

The importance of this action is not that it constituted a major project but that it took place as far south as South Carolina, which would have been unthinkable a few years before.

### **MIAMI, FLORIDA**

Never prior to the spring of 1959 had the sit-in technique been used as far south as Miami, Florida. The furthest south it had been employed until then by CORE was over 1,000 miles northward in St. Louis and in Charleston, West Virginia.

True, Miami is sometimes described as "south of the south" to differentiate it

from its geographic location. It has many permanent residents who have migrated from the north and midwest, not to speak of the hordes of sun-seeking vacationists. But the deep-south pattern of total racial segregation prevails.

In such a locale it was big news on April 29 when 20 Negro and white CORE members sat down at Grant's lunch counter and remained there though they were refused service. Reporters, photographers and TV men were out in force to cover this unprecedented event. Thus opened the initial campaign by a newly formed CORE group.

"Several factors combined in January to motivate a few Miamians to send out a call for CORE field secretaries," explains Mrs. Shirley Zoloth, one of the group's initiators. "Main factor was that when four Negro children were approved for assignment to the previously all-white Orchard Villa elementary school, CORE's outstanding community work in the Nashville school situation was recalled and CORE's presence in Miami was felt needed.

"Field Secretaries James McCain and Gordon Carey arrived on February 28 and by March 12, Greater Miami CORE had







its first meeting with some 15 members. Dr. John Brown, an ophthalmologist, became temporary chairman and subsequently headed CORE's initial project, which was not school desegregation, but what was deemed one of the most illogical areas of discrimination: the downtown dimestore and department store lunch counters."

## FIRST PROJECT

Negroes were permitted to eat next to whites—standing up but not sitting down. They could eat at stand-up sections of the counters but not at the main sections which have stools. There was no downtown Miami lunch counter where a United States Negro could sit down for a meal, though some served Spanish-speaking Latin-Americans of equally dark complexion. Being the U.S. city closest to Latin-American countries, Miami has a sizeable Spanish-speaking community.

The justice and logic of CORE's request that Negroes be served sitting down, was not denied by store managers with whom the group had negotiated. But each one refused to be first to change.

*The public readiness for such a change was indicated by a local TV commentator's survey made outside Grant's during the first sit-in. Of 100 white passersby interviewed, 98 not only had no objection*

*to Negroes being served, seated, but were unaware of the existence of the prevailing policy. Another indication was the fact that during sit-ins at Grant's five months later, white customers would take seats next to the interracial groups sitting-in, without paying the slightest attention.*

Throughout the campaign, customers showed little hostility and, on occasion, sympathy. Only a few reacted to the sit-ins by making anti-Negro or anti-Semitic remarks.

As a result of the general interest aroused by the initial sit-ins at Grant's and McCrory's, Miami CORE found itself with an increasing number of supporters. Tests were then conducted at Woolworth's and Kress's; at three department store lunch counters: Jackson's-Byrons, Burdine's, Richard's; at two of the Walgreen drug-store lunch counters and at several Royal Castle Hamburger counters. Meetings with several managers and with the Better Business Division of the Chamber of Commerce followed.

## ACTION INSTITUTE

During the ensuing months the group conducted a number of sit-ins involving as many as 50 persons. During the first two weeks of September, the group's ranks were reinforced by 12 participants in a CORE-sponsored Interracial Action Institute who came from various parts of the country to learn about non-violent action both in theory and practice. The practice came with the sit-ins which at that juncture were concentrated on Jackson's-Byrons.

Six days of continuous sit-ins caused management to close the counter temporarily while considering a policy change. During that period the sit-ins were transferred to Grant's. The day before the Institute's conclusion, management's attorney promised an immediate policy change. Institute participants left for their homes, elated, but before most of them had reached their destinations, a test at the reopened lunch counter proved that

management had not acted in good faith. Negroes were still refused service.

So, the group determined to return every day. The lunch counter had about 40 seats and on September 23, 40 persons were sitting-in. Two days later there were 80 volunteers; half of them had to go to Grant's. It is not easy to get that number of people on a weekday to sit-in from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. but CORE maintained these daily demonstrations for an entire week. One woman who sat-in daily, worked at a night-shift job. Cab drivers and off-duty Negro policemen joined the group at the counter. Fair-minded Miami-ans were tired of this kind of segregation and were ready to combat it at great personal sacrifice.

But, also on September 23, Gordon Carey, CORE field secretary, was attacked and roughed up upon leaving the rest room and warned to "get out of Miami by Monday." Two days later, two CORE members, one of whom is a partially paralyzed war veteran, were dragged from their seats, severely beaten and then arrested along with their assailant. Dr. Brown, leader of the lunch counter campaign, was threatened in his office by an ex-convict who said he "had been contacted by some people to do something about you and the organization."

## ONE COUNTER CLOSES

Immediately following these incidents, the Jackson's-Byrons lunch counter was closed permanently and the equipment dismantled.

"We did not want this to happen," Carey commented. "Repeatedly, we had stressed the simplicity of the situation, yet management chose to shut down rather than sell a sandwich and a cup of coffee to a Negro."

*As one of the sit-in group expressed it: "Well, at least we're now all equal in Jackson's-Byrons; now nobody eats."*

On October 1, 1959, Florida's attorney general issued an opinion that restaurant owners have a right to refuse service to anybody—a legal doctrine opposite to that prevailing in most other states.

Speaking on behalf of CORE, Dr. Brown promised a court challenge of this ruling. At the same time he pledged continuation of the campaign until downtown Miami lunch counters are open to all regardless of color.

*"We are going to use the same means of non-violence which we have followed thus far,"* he told the press.

In the summer of 1960 as a result of the CORE sit-in campaign some 30 restaurants in the downtown area desegregated.

## EQUALITY UNDER THE SOUTHERN SUN

A few weeks after Dr. Brown's statement, non-violence came into play on the beaches. Beginning in November 1959, members of Miami CORE in cooperation with the local NAACP began using Dade County facilities (see cover picture). Although an announced change in official Miami jimcrow policy had been precipitately rescinded, CORE members have used "white" beaches several times with scant attention and no objections from others on the sand or in the sea.



**KNOCK ON ANY DOOR**

**KNOCK ON ANY DOOR**

**KNOCK ON ANY DOOR**



**A**S CORE GROUPS IN THE SOUTH concentrate on schools, voting and public accommodations, those further north focus on employment and housing. Indeed, the employment methods developed by St. Louis CORE are adaptable to any community with a large Negro population—South as well as North. In these two areas, non-violent action can prove as effective as in restaurants, theaters, and amusement parks, with which this technique is generally associated.


In employment, particularly, successful CORE actions have taken place in a number of communities. Individual companies have been persuaded to change to a fair employment policy under which employees are hired regardless of color in skilled as well as unskilled capacities. How CORE technique works in employment is most clearly illustrated with a play-by-play account of a St. Louis project compiled by three of its participants: Charles and Marian Oldham and Vera Williams.

### THE "TAYSTEE" PROJECT

In the fall of 1958 after a joint CORE-NAACP motorcade and an impending mass picket demonstration got department stores to start hiring Negro sales clerks, St. Louis CORE was ready for a new employment project. Inevitably, many different fields were suggested: trade schools, oil companies, bakeries. Following a thorough study by the group, the baking field was chosen because bread is a product bought by every Negro family in the city and hence one whose producers should be sensitive to the problem of employing Negroes. However, the prevailing policy of St. Louis bakeries was to employ Negroes in maintenance work only, giving them the lofty title of "sanitation engineer." A CORE survey revealed that no Negroes were employed in the production department of any bakery, that only one firm had Negroes on its office staff, but that several companies had Negro driver-salesmen.

After choosing the category of bakeries it was decided to concentrate on a particular company. Taystee Bread was selected because at least 20% of its product is sold to Negroes, because its plant and office are located in the center of the Negro ghetto and because it was one of the firms which employed Negroes only as maintenance workers.

Following a fruitless conference with the manager in which he denied any discrimination, CORE decided to inform the public of Taystee's refusal to hire



Negroes in either production or sales.

Retail store owners in the neighborhood of the plant were asked to sign cards saying: *"I believe the Taystee Bread Co. Should Employ Negroes in All Capacities."* The CORE group began mailing the signed cards to the company at the rate of five a day. Unable to contact the manager by the end of a week, CORE spread the card-signing over a wider area and started sending them to Taystee at the rate of ten a day. Subsequently the number was increased to fifteen a day and then to twenty.

By this time the manager made himself available to CORE and promised to consider hiring Negro production workers if



any should apply. With his permission, CORE sent a press release to the Negro weeklies. The Urban League was contacted. A special newsletter was sent to all Negro churches. To make sure of at least some Negro applicants, CORE members themselves applied for jobs at Taystee only to be met with stalling tactics.

When CORE next succeeded in contacting the manager, he admitted that many Negroes had applied but stated he had not had time to examine the applications. He pleaded for another month. At the end of that time he asked for an additional delay of a few months.

## ORGANIZED BOYCOTT

With no progress at the end of the second delay, CORE resolved to ask retail store owners to put signs in their windows saying: "*We Don't Sell Taystee Bread Due to Discriminatory Employment Policy.*" It was decided to start with a small area and if results were not forthcoming, to spread out over the city. Of 90 stores visited, two-thirds agreed to stop selling Taystee Bread and to put the signs in their windows. The job was made more difficult by a Taystee public relations man who followed CORE deputations into the stores and denied that the company discriminated. Some stores then resumed selling Taystee Bread until visited again by CORE members who informed them about the truth of the situation.

At this point the manager appealed to the Negro alderman from the ward where the plant is located. This alderman agreed to discuss the matter at the company office, but with the proviso that CORE representatives be present.

The outcome of this conference was an agreement by management to upgrade two Negro maintenance men to production and to hire a Negro driver-salesman immediately with others to follow. CORE in turn removed its window-signs and suggested that the stores resume sale of Taystee Bread. In contacting the com-

pany for an initial progress report, CORE learned that Taystee had put into effect the terms of its agreement. An understanding was reached by which CORE contacts Taystee every six months for a new progress report. Simultaneously with the Taystee campaign, CORE was negotiating with five other large bakeries—and a furniture store.

## FAIR HOUSING

This is the next-to-last act of a real-life drama on housing. The photo was taken during a 25-hour sit-in in October 1961 at the rental office of the Ira Management Corporation, Brooklyn, N. Y.



The cast at extreme left, Mrs. Margaret Chapman, who as an outcome of the sit-in, secured the apartment which she had previously been refused because of her color. Mrs. Chapman, a medical secretary, is a widowed mother of three children.

Next to her is Mrs. Rioghan Kirchner, chairman of Brooklyn CORE's housing committee. Entering the door, with a bag of food for the sit-inners is Arnold Goldwag, who, on behalf of his "sister," was shown the 3-room apartment which Mrs. Chapman had tried, unsuccessfully, to rent.

To Goldwag's right is his "sister"—who in reality is Mrs. Sonya Zelwain—and her

son Eric. To their right is Dr. Robert Palmer, chairman of Brooklyn CORE.

Rental office sit-ins together with picketing have proved successful with adamant landlords in several localities. However, landlords who have committed an act of discrimination often change policy when caught red-handed—particularly in states with fair housing laws. Landlords are thus confronted with the discriminated Negro at the very moment when the white tester who followed and was granted an apartment is at the point of signing his lease. This timing can be easily arranged by the particular CORE group involved.

*In testing housing—whether it be a hotel, motel, apartment or house—a white CORE member applies within a few moments after a Negro is refused. If this white person is accepted, the landlord cannot use the standard excuses that there are no vacancies or that apparent vacancies have already been filled.*

When the first Negro family moves into a previously all white neighborhood, there may be threats of violence. CORE action can help stop such threats from being carried out. Los Angeles CORE in 1958 had an emergency committee, prepared to stand nonviolent guard duty. This committee established an all-night vigil when violence was threatened against a Negro teacher and his family who had bought a home in a formerly white area. There was no violence.

Once Negroes, in substantial numbers, move into a formerly white neighborhood, there is a danger that whites will move out and the neighborhood will become a new Negro ghetto. In fact this trend is often accelerated by unscrupulous real estate operators who incite panic-selling in changing neighborhoods. This danger can be—and has successfully been—averted by a prompt community education program which CORE groups can help initiate. Whites in changing neighborhoods have been persuaded to erect signs saying: “*This house is NOT for sale: we believe in democracy.*”

Both in Boston and New York, CORE groups were active in campaigns which brought about passage of fair-housing legislation. To translate the new laws into reality, thousands of CORE leaflets were distributed emphasizing that under the law, people can move into any section of the city they may choose. The leaflets offered free assistance to apartment and house hunters. Actual cases of discrimination were followed-through by nonviolent action which in many cases succeeded in winning for Negroes the homes of their choice.

Perhaps the most sustained housing campaign conducted by a CORE group was in Boston. For that reason, Boston was selected as the site for CORE’s first special Action Institute to be devoted to housing, only. It took place in mid-summer 1961.



GENTLEMEN, BE SEATED

GENTLEMEN, BE SEATED

GENTLEMEN, BE SEATED



ADELMAN

**N**ONVIOLENT ACTION, in which CORE pioneered since 1943, was first used on a mass scale in 1956. For an entire year, 42,000 Negroes in Montgomery, Alabama, simply ceased riding the city's buses rather than be humiliated by segregated seating. Their peaceful boycott, directed by Martin Luther King and other leaders of the Montgomery Improvement Association, succeeded in desegregating the city's buses.



## LUNCH COUNTER SIT-INS

The second instance of a mass resort to nonviolence, was the 1960 lunch counter sit-in movement. Setting this off, was a student sit-in on February 1 at Woolworth's lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina.

Dr. George Simkins, Jr., head of the Greensboro NAACP, approached CORE on behalf of the students to gain the benefits of CORE's 18 years experience in nonviolence. CORE immediately dispatched its two field secretaries, Gordon R. Carey and James T. McCain to work with the students in Greensboro and in other cities where lunch counter sit-ins

followed. Within a month they had spread to 25 cities in 5 states. The arrest of some 200 sit-inners in several communities on charges of "*trespassing*" failed to stem the tide.

Despite the large numbers of students involved and despite taunting by rowdy gangs of white youths in some cities, outbreaks of violence were few and minor. The students grasped the importance of maintaining nonviolence, regardless of provocation.

The major dimestore chains were the chief targets of the sit-ins. In many cities outside of the south, these stores were picketed by students and other groups supporting the southern sit-inners.





The technique in which CORE had pioneered since 1943 with very little publicity, had finally become nationwide news copy. As a result, the organization for the first time became widely known throughout the U.S. The number of its contributors rose sharply and the organization was consequently able to expand.

*CORE placed its entire resources behind the student movement. Its affiliated groups in the south were mobilized to engage in sit-ins. Those outside of the south were urged to conduct supporting picket demonstrations.*

The students considered the lunch counter campaign their own protest movement and viewed it with pride. Generally, they chose to act independently from existing civil rights organizations. However, they welcomed the aid of these organizations and particularly of CORE, whose special field is nonviolence. CORE was called upon, in particular, to conduct workshops on nonviolence. CORE also remained in negotiations with the major dimestore chains throughout the sit-ins in an effort to effect the policy change as swiftly and smoothly as possible. CORE also contacted many church, union and civic groups to rally support for the students.

## MASS PROTESTS

From the sit-ins evolved mass marches and civil rights rallies involving a total number of students in the thousands. The number arrested in these demonstrations was well over a thousand.

In Orangeburg, South Carolina, 350 of 550 arrested students were herded into an open-air stockade in sub-freezing weather because the city and county jails were not big enough to hold them. Prior to the arrests, police intercepted their protest march with tear gas and fire hoses. The students stood in the stockade, well-dressed, calm, singing "God Bless America."

A similar peaceful mass protest by students in Montgomery, Alabama, scene of the 1956 bus boycott, brought to the campus a cordon of police armed with guns

and tear gas. These displays of police force failed to deter the students. Other mass demonstrations followed those in Montgomery and Orangeburg.

The process of lunch counter desegregation took place fast. Two months after the sit-ins started, approximately 100 eating places throughout the deep south had changed policy. By Mid-summer community-wide lunch counter desegregation had taken place in many localities. A survey of eight such localities by the Southern Regional Council showed that the stores whose lunch counters had desegregated were prospering.

*"Where settlements have been reached, there has been little solace for the south's prophets of disaster,"* the survey report said. *"No store in the south which has opened its lunch counters to Negroes has reported a loss in business. Managers have reported business as usual or noted an increase."*

*"Negroes have not congregated to demonstrate a victory. Those who have appeared at lunch counters have done so with dignity. White customers have observed the change calmly for the most part and without a break in their shopping routine."*

## JAIL-INS

Within the first year of the sit-ins, lunch counter desegregation came to 134 southern communities. In February 1961 a new word came into our vocabulary: JAIL-INS. It was coined by newspapermen in reference to the increasing number of southern students who, to emphasize the injustice of being arrested for protesting racial discrimination, chose to remain in jail rather than pay fines or go out on bail. The first student jail-in occurred less than three months after the sit-ins started. It involved five members of the student CORE group in Tallahassee, Florida. One of them Patricia Stephens, wrote from Leon County Jail where she and the others were imprisoned 49 days: *"We could be out on appeal but we all strongly believe that Martin Luther King*



*was right when he said: 'We've got to fill the jails in order to win our equal rights.'*"

Jail-ins reached a peak in February 1961 with a total of 100. The jail-in which sparkplugged this trend was by eight Friendship Junior College students in Rock Hill, South Carolina and a former Claffin student, Thomas Gaither, who had become a CORE field secretary. These nine were the first student sit-inners to be committed to a road gang. They served 30 days rather than pay \$100 fines.

How they felt about it was aptly expressed in a letter which Clarence Graham wrote his mother and father at one in the morning, the day he was to jail-in. *"Try to understand that what I'm doing is right,"* the letter said. *"It isn't like going to jail for a crime like stealing or killing, but we are going for the betterment of all Negroes."*

The conviction and dedication of the student sit-inners is conveyed in the concluding paragraphs of *"Jailed-In,"* a pam-

phlet which Thomas Gaither wrote following his release.

*"Our 30 days on the road gang were over, but not our struggle to end lunch counter discrimination in Rock Hill. One of our group, Willy Massy, was back in jail again less than two weeks later. He and four other students were arrested March 14 for picketing a drug store with a segregated lunch counter. Like our group, they refused to pay fines. The day before, two other members of our group—John Gaines and Robert McCullough—were assaulted on the picket line by white hoodlums, Gaines was clubbed unconscious and taken to York County hospital. Two hours later, he and McCullough resumed picketing accompanied by three others of our group—Clarence Graham, James Wells and me.*

*"These students are determined to carry on the nonviolent action campaign until Rock Hill's lunch counters desegregate. Our jail-in has strengthened—not weakened that determination."*



"...AND LEAVE THE DRIVING TO US"

"...AND LEAVE THE DRIVING TO US"

"...AND LEAVE THE DRIVING TO US"



**T**HE TERM "FREEDOM RIDE" was originated by CORE in 1961. But the idea of challenging southern bus segregation by direct action was first put into practice by CORE 14 years earlier, with the Journey of Reconciliation. In April 1947, ten months after the Supreme Court had issued its initial decision outlawing segregation in interstate travel, 16 whites and Negroes set out on an interracial bus trip through the upper south, challenging the jimcrow seating pattern.

They found that drivers and passengers were ready to accept desegregation. Aboard buses where drivers ignored the group's Negroes sitting in front seats, passengers did likewise. Arrests or threatened arrests were the exception and even in the five instances where arrests occurred, there were no outbreaks of violence

—except in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, where the group was attacked by some white cab drivers. All but one of the arrest cases were either dropped or won by CORE on appeal. In the one case which was lost on a technicality, three of the riders served 30 days on a North Carolina road gang.

Even before the 1947 Journey was over, the question of another such trip was discussed. Several years later an attempt was made to organize one, but it never materialized. In the winter of 1961, riding aboard a bus together, Thomas Gaither and Gordon Carey of the CORE field staff broached the subject in earnest and devised the term Freedom Ride. The idea was accepted enthusiastically by the next national CORE council meeting and the Ride was set for early May, from Washington to New Orleans. What made the timing particularly opportune was that in December the Supreme Court had extended its original 1946 decision to cover all terminal facilities—restaurants, waiting rooms, rest rooms, etc.

*The 1961 Freedom Ride would test the terminals—not merely the seating aboard buses. Also, in the event of arrest, participants would be committed to be jailed in rather than accept bail or pay fines.*

## **FIRST FREEDOM RIDE**


On May 4, 13 Freedom Riders includ-

ing James Farmer, national director of CORE and Jim Peck, who had been on the 1947 Journey, set out from Washington following a 4-day training session in nonviolence.

*“The integration of seating was a sharp contrast to the situation prevailing at the time of the 1947 Journey when CORE testers were virtually the only passengers to ride non-jimcrow,”* Peck wrote in the next CORElator. *“However, the same rigid segregation which prevailed in seating at that time now prevails at the terminals and rest stops.”*

As far as Alabama, except for an incident with white hoodlums in Rock Hill, South Carolina—the Ride progressed peacefully. There were three arrests—but the case in Charlotte, North Carolina was dismissed and the two cases in Winnsboro, South Carolina, were dropped after the arrested Riders were jailed overnight. Across Georgia, the Riders traveled using all the terminal facilities without incident. There was no segregationist violence or police interference—even in Athens, which had been the scene of mob action the previous fall following admission of two Negro college students.

In Alabama, mob violence occurred on May 14. A Greyhound bus with the first contingent of Freedom Riders was bombed and burned by a segregationist crowd







outside of Anniston. A gang of hoodlums boarded a Trailways bus in Anniston and assaulted members of the second contingent. Upon arrival in Birmingham, Jim Peck was beaten almost to death and Charles Person was badly injured by a waiting mob as the two entered the Trailways terminal restaurant. Segregationist violence erupted again a week later when a second group of Freedom Riders, most of them Nashville students, arrived in Montgomery. Like in Birmingham, no uniformed police were at the bus station and the riders were ruthlessly beaten with all types of weapons as they debarked.

## FREEDOM RIDES ROLL ON

The mob violence in Alabama, reported by newspapers, radio and TV the world-over, shocked many people. Prospective Freedom Riders started writing the CORE office and applying in person. Starting in June an intense mobilization of Freedom Riders was coordinated by CORE, the Nashville Nonviolent Movement, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Over the summer, the Freedom Rides became a movement, as had the lunch counter sit-ins the year before. Most of the Negro participants were southern Negro students who had been active

in the sit-ins. Most of the whites were young people from sections other than the south. One contingent of Freedom Riders journeyed all the way from California and another from the state of Washington. One contingent included ministers and rabbis only. Another included professional people only.

Most of the Rides wound up in Jackson, Mississippi, where all Freedom Riders were automatically arrested and jailed for "*disturbing the peace.*" The largest number imprisoned at one time came to almost 200. Hinds County, where Jackson is located, had to take over a building of the State Prison in Parchman, Mississippi, to house all the imprisoned Riders. Most of them, including James Farmer, remained in jail for 40 days and then came out,



as required by state law if a case is to be appealed. A few served their full sentences, which ranged up to six months, without appealing.

## RESULTS OF THE RIDES

On September 22 the Interstate Commerce Commission issued new regulations prohibiting interstate carriers from segregating and from using terminal facilities which segregate. That these new regulations were a direct outcome of the Freedom Rides was asserted in many newspaper stories and editorials.

Immediately following November 1, the compliance date, CORE dispatched test teams throughout the deep south. They found a pattern of substantial compliance except in Mississippi and most of Louisiana. Surprisingly, Alabama was not in the ranks of the generally non-complying states. At Anniston, Birmingham and Montgomery, where the first Freedom Riders had been assaulted by segregationist mobs, test teams were served without incident. However, in Alabama, as in South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, compliance is by no means complete particularly in the smaller, outlying communities.

As James Farmer stated: *"The ICC regulations, while helpful, can prove truly effective only if they are translated into action by interstate passengers' traveling unsegregated and insisting on their right to do so."*

The 1961 Freedom Rides spelled the beginning of the end of bus segregation in the deep south. CORE plans to continue freedom riding until Mississippi, Louisiana and other isolated pockets of segregation fall into line.



## U.S. ROUTE #40

An outstanding example of the effectiveness of nonviolent action is CORE's U.S. Route #40 project. On the section of that highway between the Delaware Memorial Bridge and Baltimore, restaurants had discriminated repeatedly against African diplomats traveling between the United Nations and the U.S. capital. American Negroes seeking service at these eating places were arrested. The situation had become so embarrassing, internationally, that President Kennedy and the State Department interceded. Nevertheless, the incidents of discrimination continued.

As a result, CORE initiated a Freedom Motorcade scheduled for November 11, 1961, in which participants would sit-in at the many eating places along the road and, if necessary, face arrest. Over 1,400 Riders volunteered. Three days before November 11, the majority of the restaurant owners—35 in Maryland and 12 in Delaware—agreed to desegregate. The Motorcade was postponed. Subsequent CORE tests proved that almost all of the 47 restaurants were complying as were some of those who had not been party to the agreement. The holdouts were the targets of a Motorcade on December 16 and of further CORE action. *"I'm not bitter about CORE's role in this thing,"* commented one of the restaurant owners. *"Let's face it, we never would have done it if they had not applied pressure."*



*This booklet was written by Jim Peck and designed by Jerry Goldman. The chapter, "Dinner at Stoner's" is reprinted from a pamphlet about CORE's early years by George Houser.*

**CORE**

38 Park Row New York 38, N. Y.



*38 Park Row, New York 38, New York*

\$1.00 per copy

(Reduced prices on quantity orders)





# THE RIGHT TO VOTE



by James T. McCain, CORE Director of Organization







This is Sumter, South Carolina . . . my home town. I was born here, educated in its public schools and graduated from Morris College. I played on those of its streets which were not paved.





I have seen Sumter grow in population to approximately 24,000 people and spread out over a wide area. I have watched its acorns grow into mighty oaks which have become a source of local pride.





**COLORED  
ENTRANCE**

RAGSDALE HEWITT, M.D.

NORMAN C. EADY, M.D.

As a Negro boy, I knew there were differences.



But as I grew up, I increasingly became aware that day-to-day living for a Negro in Sumter was not only different, but separate and unequal.



After graduation, I became a teacher and, eventually, a school principal. I was dismissed on suspicion of having gotten parents' signatures in initiating a petition to desegregate the Mullins, South Carolina, public schools. Blacklisted as a teacher, I was unable to find another position in the county.


I had been working on voter registration even before Negroes legally won the right to vote in the state primaries. In 1958, the year after passage of the first federal civil rights law in 87 years, I took a position with CORE, heading a statewide voter registration campaign. That drive has been stepped-up recently under the direction of Frank Robinson, a longtime friend and also a native of Sumter.



These photos show Frank performing the important first step of house-to-house canvassing. It is necessary to explain to each person why it is important for them to register.








Next comes instruction on how to fill out registration blanks. CORE registration instruction headquarters is open daily. In the center of the next page, Frank's daughter is demonstrating how to complete the blanks.













Here, Frank accompanies three persons to the registration office in the Sumter County courthouse.





Most persons register without major difficulty.





Applicants rejected because of an error on their blank are given further instruction and are taken back to the registration office to re-apply. Within a month, 750 persons visited our registration instruction headquarters for advice or help in qualifying to register.







The task of registration is completed.







In my first annual report after going to work for CORE, I pointed out that in counties where we had established voter registration committees, the percentage of Negroes registered was higher than in counties where no such group had been functioning. For the first time, during the year's primary runoffs, candidates invited Negroes to meet with them and discuss community problems. In a number of communities, candidates who stressed segregation were defeated. Negroes ran for public office in larger numbers than in any year since winning the right to vote in the formerly all-white state primaries.

For example, in that year Negroes for the first time took over all Democratic Party offices in Sumter's Precinct 3-B and elected 16 of the 17 delegates to the Democratic County Convention. Rev. Fred C. James, a Negro and a leader of Sumter CORE, set a precedent by running for city council. In Columbia, according to "The State," a daily newspaper, "the predominantly Negro Ward 9—was more than enough to



make the difference" of 14 votes by which Lester Bates nosed out his ultra-segregationist opponent in the mayoralty election.

These types of advances were augmented in subsequent years, as the South Carolina voter registration campaign continued.

In Sumter County, registrars have begun using technicalities to bar Negroes from registering. This has long been the practice in Clarendon County where, in 1958, an applicant reported to me that she had been refused a certificate because she mispronounced the word "indict" in reading a portion of the state constitution. And in Williamsburg County, Negroes — some of them teachers and college graduates — were summarily refused registration certificates because in the registrar's opinion, they could not read or write.

It is this kind of technicality which is used today throughout rural areas of the deep south to deny Negroes their constitutional right to vote. Reports of the United States Civil Rights Commission give detailed descriptions of these devices. In one case brought by the federal government, a Louisiana registrar was revealed as unable to pass the test which she gave to prospective Negro voters. Negroes frequently are threatened with loss of job and even with physical violence, if they dare to exercise their voting rights.

Where such a situation prevails, there is need for the type of nonviolent action on voting which Martin Luther King has advocated. This would consist of Negroes assembling nonviolently at registration offices and remaining until registered. In such areas, voting rights must first be won before they can be exercised.

For every United States citizen, voting is a democratic duty. For us, who are Negroes in the south, it is more than that. It is an essential step toward winning equality and ending our second class citizenship. When we win the right to vote in those parts of the south where it is still denied us and when we exercise our voting rights throughout the south, we can put the ultra-segregationist politicians out of business. We can make the south a part of the United States.





Edited by **Jim Peck**  
Photographs by **Bob Adelman**  
Designed by **Jerrold Goldman**  
Published **August, 1962,**



38 Park Row,  
New York 38, N. Y.

Price 40¢      Reduction on quantity orders





# THE RIGHT TO VOTE



by James T. McCain, CORE Director of Organization







This is Sumter, South Carolina . . . my home town. I was born here, educated in its public schools and graduated from Morris College. I played on those of its streets which were not paved.





I have seen Sumter grow in population to approximately 24,000 people and spread out over a wide area. I have watched its acorns grow into mighty oaks which have become a source of local pride.





**COLORED  
ENTRANCE**

RAGSDALE HEWITT, M.D.

NORMAN C. EADY, M.D.

As a Negro boy, I knew there were differences.



But as I grew up, I increasingly became aware that day-to-day living for a Negro in Sumter was not only different, but separate and unequal.



After graduation, I became a teacher and, eventually, a school principal. I was dismissed on suspicion of having gotten parents' signatures in initiating a petition to desegregate the Mullins, South Carolina, public schools. Blacklisted as a teacher, I was unable to find another position in the county.

I had been working on voter registration even before Negroes legally won the right to vote in the state primaries. In 1958, the year after passage of the first federal civil rights law in 87 years, I took a position with CORE, heading a statewide voter registration campaign. That drive has been stepped-up recently under the direction of Frank Robinson, a longtime friend and also a native of Sumter.



These photos show Frank performing the important first step of house-to-house canvassing. It is necessary to explain to each person why it is important for them to register.








Next comes instruction on how to fill out registration blanks. CORE registration instruction headquarters is open daily. In the center of the next page, Frank's daughter is demonstrating how to complete the blanks.













Here, Frank accompanies three persons to the registration office in the Sumter County courthouse.





Most persons register without major difficulty.





Applicants rejected because of an error on their blank are given further instruction and are taken back to the registration office to re-apply. Within a month, 750 persons visited our registration instruction headquarters for advice or help in qualifying to register.







The task of registration is completed.







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
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